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Note

Contribution Among
Negligent Tortfeasors:

The New Rule and Beyond
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 193 Neb. 752,
229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., ' the
Nebraska Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to
determine whether there exists in Nebraska a right of equitable contribution between negligent judgment debtors after one such tortfeasor has discharged either the entire judgment or an amount
exceeding his share of such liability. While Royal Indemnity represented only the third instance2 in the last half century in which
this issue was addressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court, this modicum of Nebraska decisional law had, until this decision, been interpreted as prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors.3 Unlike a majority of American jurisdictions which have enacted laws
allowing contribution in some degree among negligent tortfeasors,
4
Nebraska has no such statute.
1. 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
2. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 185
Neb. 4, 173 N.W.2d 378 (1969); Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, 136
N.W.2d 194 (1965). See also Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp.
150 (D. Neb. 1950), which was decided during this period and interpreted Nebraska case law as prohibiting contribution among negligent
tortfeasors.
3. After an exhaustive review of Nebraska case law, a commentator recently concluded that "[ilt seems clear that the Nebraska Supreme
Court does not allow contribution between joint tortfeasors and is not
likely to do so in the future." Busick, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors in Nebraska,7 CrEGHTON L. REv. 182, 204 (1974).
4. To date, thirty-seven states sanction contribution among joint tortfeasors. In 1939, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UNiaomv CoNT I ioN AONG ToRTrFSso s ACT, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975).

In 1955, a revision of this act was
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The fact that Nebraska's erstwhile rule prohibiting contribution
had as its sole precursor the English common law required the Nebraska Supreme Court to review and analyze that common law
foundation in addition to relevant Nebraska decisions. In so doing,
the court, in an articulate decision authored by Justice Brodkey,
placed its imprimatur on the ability of a negligent co-tortfeasor to
proceed against other judgment-debtors and seek equitable contribution when he had been forced to discharge more than his "proportional share" 5 of such liability. While recognizing the valid policy considerations that militate against allowing contribution among
intentional or knowing wrongdoers, the court held that those policy
considerations were unpersuasive when applied to joint tortfeasors
whose liability was occasioned upon acts of mere negligence.
This note will review the court's analysis in Royal Indemnity
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,6 and highlight the basis the
court used to determine that prior Nebraska case law had erroneously applied relevant common law principles. Finally, there will
be a discussion of several of the potential defenses which may be
asserted to deny a right of contribution and whether such defenses
should be sustained in light of the policy reasons underlying the
Royal Indemnity decision.
II.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

Royal Indemnity was the outgrowth of a negligence action involving three defendants. The original action resulted from the
consolidation of individual suits brought by three separate parties
against all the defendants seeking to recover for fire losses allegedly
caused by the latter's concurrent negligence.7 Royal Indemnity
approved by the Conference. UNEo'mv CoNTRuIUTIoN AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). Ten states have enacted the 1939

Act and six states have as yet adopted the 1955 revision. The 1939
Uniform Act is in force in Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and
South Dakota. The 1955 revision has been adopted by Alaska, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota and Tennessee. Additionally, twelve other states have enacted various forms of legislation
that afford a right of contribution among negligent tortfeasors. Prior
to Royal Indemnity, nine states allowed contribution by judicial mandate. See Allen, Joint Tortfeasors-A Case For Unlimited Contribution, 43 Mss. L.J. 50 (1972); Wilson, The Rule Against Contribution
and Its Status in Nebraska, 37 NEB. L. REv. 820, 822 (1958).
5. 193 Neb. at 764, 229 N.W.2d at 190.
6. 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
7. It was uncontroverted at trial that the fire giving rise to the action
was caused by an unshielded resister coil on the underside of a forklift coming into contact with highly combustible material. The defendants in the action were L & M Paper Co., the owner of the fork-
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Company ("Royal"), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
("Aetna"), and Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company ("Iowa
National"), as insurers of the defendants, actively participated in
the suit by defending their respective insureds." After the jury
found that the plaintiffs' losses were the result of each defendant's
affirmative negligence, judgments were entered in favor of each
plaintiff.9 Exclusive of costs the combined judgments for the three
plaintiffs totalled $469,031.35.10 After the plaintiffs' verdicts had
been affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Libbey-Owens
Ford Glass Co. v. L & M Paper Co.," the several plaintiffs instituted garnishment proceedings to collect the entire judgment from
Royal. Although each defendant had been found negligent and despite the fact it was the insurer of only one of the judgment-debtors, Royal was compelled to discharge the entire judgment, which
with accrued costs totalled $520,313.01.12
Upon discharge of that judgment, Royal, as the subrogee of the
interests of its insured judgment-debtor, instituted the instant action. It alleged that it was equitably entitled to reimbursement
from each party in an amount that would result in each of the
original co-defendants or his respective insurer bearing an equal
share of the liability for the judgment. More precisely, Royal
sought contribution from Aetna in the amount of $173,437.67 and
a like amount from Iowa National or its insured judgment-debtor,
Phil D. Fitzwater. 13 For reasons that are unclear, Fitzwater was
the only party joined in the action by Royal who had been held
14
personally liable in the seminal action.'
Demurrers to the plaintiff's petition were posed by each defendant, premised upon the contention that "an attempt to obtain con-

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

lift; All Makes Fork Lift Service, a partnership who sold the forklift
to L & M Paper Co.; Yale and Towne, Inc., the manufacturer of the
forklift; and Phil D. Fitzwater and Gerald E. Gathmann, the All Makes
partners. The plaintiffs were Libbey-Owens Ford Glass Co. and Henningsen Foods, Inc., adjacent tenants of L & M Paper Co., and O.J.
Miller, owner and lessor of the premises. Libbey-Owens Ford Glass
Co. v. L &M Paper Co., 189 Neb. 792, 793, 205 N.W.2d 523, 526 (1973).
Yale and Towne, Inc., L & M Paper Co., and All Makes Fork Lift
Service were insured by Royal Indemnity Co., Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., and Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., respectively. 193
Neb. at 753-54, 229 N.W.2d at 184.
Verdicts were returned in favor of Henningsen Foods, Libbey-Owens
and O.J. Miller in amounts of $380,596.88, $43,434.17 and $45,000.00,
respectively. Id.
Id.
189 Neb. 792, 205 N.W.2d 523 (1973).
Brief for Appellant at 9-10.
Id.
193 Neb. at 754, 229 N.W.2d at 184.
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tribution from an alleged liability insurance carrier of a joint tortfeasor... is contrary to the law of Nebraska."", The subsequent
action by the trial court sustaining each of the defendant's demurrers formed the basis of the plaintiff's appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The appellant did not contend that the trial court had erred by
misconstruing the supreme court's prior pronouncements regarding
the permissibility of contribution actions among co-judgment-debttors. Royal conceded that "[t]o date there has been no reported,
unreversed case in which contribution has been allowed."1 6 It argued, however, that the present judicial stance toward the right
of contribution among negligent tortfeasors had mistakenly failed
to recognize that the common law prohibition against contribution
was intended to be limited to instances involving intentionalwrongdoers.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The no-contribution rule under assault in Royal Indemnity is
an exception to the general rule allowing contribution among codebtors when one party satisfies more than his proportional share
of such debt or obligation. 17 This universal rule has received the
countenance of Nebraska courts.' 8 The no-contribution exception
was created by the oft-cited case of Merryweather v. Nixan 9 which
held that contribution would not be allowed between judgment
debtors found jointly liable for trover. 20 The supreme court in
Royal Indemnity properly recognized "the fact that the tortfeasors
in ...

[Merryweather] . . . were intentional wrongdoers,"'21 a crit-

ical factual limitation that had been overlooked or ignored by past
15. Brief for Appellee Aetna at 4.
16. Brief for Appellant at 22.
17. 4 PoMTEoy, EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE

§ 1418 (5th ed. 1941);

RESTATEMENT

or RESTITUTION § 81 (1937).
18. Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403
(1946).
19. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See Reath, Contribution Between
Persons, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1898). In fact, while Merryweather
is commonly cited as the case in which the no-contribution exception was first adopted, the British antipathy for contribution

actions was exhibited long before the Merryweather decision. In
Evert v. Williams, (Ex. 1725), two thieves appeared before the
court and asked for an apportionment of their "earnings." The
bill was dismissed with costs paid by the defendant. The plaintiff's
solicitor was fined, and the defense counsel was deported. The plaintiff and defendant were hanged. Put simply, contribution was not
allowed.
20. See Reath, supra note 19, at 179.
21. 193 Neb. at 756, 229 N.W.2d at 186.
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Nebraska courts. Moreover, the court accepted the appellant's contention that Merryweather had been limited to its narrow factual
pattern by the subsequent case of Adamson v. Jarvis,22 wherein
it was stated that
from reason, justice and sound policy, the rule that wrongdoers
cannot have redress or contribution against each other is confined
to cases where the person seeking redress must2 3 be presumed to
have known that he was doing an unlawful act.
Buttressing its premise that Nebraska's no-contribution rule was
alien to its common law origin, the appellant placed great reliance
on early Nebraska decisions in which the availability of court-enforced contribution was first addressed. An analysis of these early
pronouncements led Justice Brodkey to note that
[e]arly cases in this jurisdiction strongly indicate that Nebraska
followed the English Law, and would permit contribution among
joint tortfeasors where the party seeking contribution had not
been guilty of intentional wrongdoing. 24
Johnson v. Torpy 25 was such a case. It was a wrongful death
action brought under Nebraska's then existent Dramshop Act.
Both Johnson and Torpy had sold liquor to a known habitual
drunkard, actions which allegedly contributed to the drunkard's
death. The latter's wife instituted a successful negligence action
against Torpy. Torpy prevailed in a subsequent action against
Johnson for contribution but this decision was reversed by the supreme court. It stated that the sale of liquor to an habitual drunkard not only gave rise to a civil action by the injured party but
also was a statutory violation for which there was imposed a "se'26
vere penalty.
In determining whether the right of contribution exists in favor
of one wrongdoer against another the test is, must the party demanding contribution be presumed to have known that the act for
which he has been compelled to respond was wrongful. If not, he
may recover against
one equally culpable, but otherwise he is
27
without remedy.
The court indicated that because Torpy knew that the decedent was
an habitual drunkard, he was presumed to have known that he was
22. 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827).
23. Id. at 696. While not mentioned by the supreme court, it is to be
noted that England abolished the no-contribution rule embodied in
Merryweather by enactment of the Married Women and Tortfeasor
Act of 1935. For an explanation of this statute, see SAIaWONO, LAw
or ToRTs § 168 (16th ed. 1973).
24. 193 Neb. at 757, 229 N.W.2d at 186.
25. 35 Neb. 604, 53 N.W. 575 (1892).
26. Id. at 606, 53 N.W. at 576.
27. Id.

388

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 2 (1976)

committing an unlawful act. Upon remand, Torpy was unable to
overcome this presumption. 28 While in this particular decision contribution was not allowed, it is significant that the Nebraska court
embraced the Jarvis limitation that contribution would only be denied in cases where the act committed was deliberate or "intentionally wrongful." Moreover, in defining what type of acts were
deemed wrongful, Torpy held that a violation of a statute which
also gives rise to a civil action would not necessarily bar the plaintiff's right to enforce contribution but would create a presumption
that such conduct was intentional which, if not rebutted, would
deny contribution.
In Royal Indemnity, three other cases-none decided after 1908
-were advanced by the appellant as consistent with Torpy, including one decision in which the Nebraska Supreme Court had allowed
29
contribution.
The appellees based their defense of the rule forbidding contribution between tortfeasors on two relatively recent Nebraska decisions which in unequivocal terms stated that no right of contribution among tortfeasors existed in Nebraska.80
In Tober v. Hampton,'3 1 a decision that did not even involve the
issue of contribution, the Nebraska Supreme Court obliterated the
distinction recognized both at common law and in previous Nebraska decisions that denied contribution only when the liability
was a result of intentional conduct. In Tober, the plaintiff's house
28. Torpy v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 882, 62 N.W. 253 (1895).
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Avery Planter Co., 69 Neb. 329, 95 N.W. 622 (1903)
and Schappel v. First Nat'l Bank, 80 Neb. 708, 115 N.W. 317 (1908),

involved the same factual circumstances. Both cases dealt with the
wrongful attachment of a debtor's property by a sheriff. Because the
creditors joined in the defense of the trespass action against the sheriff, they were deemed to be joint tortfeasors ab initio. The suits were
instituted in order to gain contribution for the creditors' joint judgment liability. Because the action was defended in good faith, with
no intention that the trespass be committed, Avery allowed contribution to the extent of each creditor's lien on the wrongfully attached
property. This result was later affirmed in Schappel.
In Sharp v. Call, 69 Neb. 72, 95 N.W. 16 (1903), the court denied

an action for contribution among corporate trustees who had been
found liable for the fraudulent disbursement of trust funds on the
premise that the acts committed were intentional and involved moral
turpitude. The court maintained, however, the dichotomy that had
been struck in Torpy between intentional and unintentional acts and
clearly implied that contribution would have been allowed had the
acts been adjudged unintentional.
30. See note 2 supra.
31. 178 Neb. 858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).

CONTRIBUTION
sustained $6,500 in damages as a result of both the defendant's and
gas company's negligence.3 2 Prior to the suit, the plaintiff and gas
company entered into a "loan agreement" whereby the plaintiff received $3,500 which was repayable to the gas company only out of
any net proceeds that he might recover against the defendant 3
In the "loan agreement," the plaintiff also gave the gas company
full power to prosecute its action against the defendant. 34 The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Brower, held that the purported "loan agreement" was invalid and was instead a complete
settlement of the plaintiff's claim against the gas company. By
viewing the $3,500 as a settlement rather than a "loan," the court
applied a pro tanto reduction in the amount of damages that the
plaintiff could assert against the defendant. The court then resurrected the loan agreement as valid in holding that the plaintiff
ceased to be the real party at interest in the action since the amount
of damages which he could potentially recover (after application
of the pro tanto bar) was less than his obligation of repayment
to the gas company under the terms of the "loan agreement."
The obvious inconsistencies vis-a-vis the validity of the loan
agreement would have been the decision's sole significance had not
the court also addressed the issue of contribution.3 5 For unstated
reasons, the court commenced a "cursory review" of the status of
contribution in the State of Nebraska.
Apart from statute, the general rule .

.

. is that one of several

wrongdoers, who has been compelled to pay the damages for the
wrongs committed, cannot compel contribution from others who
participated in the commission of the wrong. This is a rule not
only of the common, but of the civil law, and it obtains in equity
as well as at law

...

We think the rule is sound and is amply

sustained by the reasons set out immediately following it in 18
C.J.S. § 11, p. 14. It is adopted by this court . . .36
32. Id. at 877, 136 N.W.2d at 206.
33. Id. at 864-66, 136 N.W.2d at 199-200.
34. Id. While nothing in the opinion indicates whether the defendant was

made aware of the existence of the "loan agreement," it seems reasonable to suggest that the Tober court was influenced by the obvious

prejudicial effect that such an agreement had on the defendant. While
such settlement agreements (commonly referred to as Mary Carter
Agreements) are outside the scope of this note, the champertous nature of such agreements and their prejudicial effect on non-agreeing
defendants are cogently illustrated in Note, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort
Actions, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1974).
35. For an analysis of the supreme court's now-you-see-it-now-you-don't
treatment of the loan agreement, see Note, Joint Tort-feasors-Validity
of Loan Agreements and Use of Pro Tanto Bar, 45 NEB. L. REv. 790
(1966).
36. 178 Neb. at 873, 136 N.W.2d at 204.
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The court inexplicably proceeded to overrule expressly First
National Bank v. Avery Planter Co.Y' and Schappel v. First National Bank,38 both post-Torpy decisions which had countenanced
contribution upon a showing by the claimant that his liability had
resulted from acts of good faith and not intentional wrongdoing.
Justice Brodkey's review of the Tober decision charitably stated
that "the necessity of the court's ruling on the issue of contribution
is unclear."8 9
Farmer's Elevator Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Mutual
Liability Insurance Co.40 was the final case considered by the court
in Royal Indemnity. It involved an action brought in federal court
by a construction company employee against a defendant upon
whose premises his injury had occurred. The defendant brought
a third-party action against the construction company and judgments in both the first and second-party actions found both the
construction company and the first-party defendant negligent. A
declaratory judgment proceeding followed in state court in order
to determine which party's insurer was liable for the plaintiff's
damages. In an opinion written by Justice Carter, it was held that
the construction company's insurer was not liable to indemnify the
first-party defendant because of certain language included in the
policy contract. The court stated further, however, that "both joint
tort-feasors being active wrongdoers, contribution cannot be maintained by one against the other. '41 While the court left the implication that it had not completely slammed the doors on arguments
in futuro that contribution might be proper in instances where a
party's liability was caused by the doctrine of respondeat superior
or some other type of vicarious liability, the Farmer'sElevator dictum made it fully apparent that an action for contribution would
not lie between persons whose liability was grounded upon acts of
negligence-however unintentional they might be.
In Royal Indemnity, the appellants forcefully argued in their
brief that the initial dichotomy developed by Merryweather and
its English progeny was borne from the strong British policy that
the courts should not allow a litigant to use them to help him profit
from his own wrongdoing.42 Moreover, to deny contribution would
serve as a deterrent to those about to commit intentional torts.
37. 69 Neb. 329, 95 N.W. 622 (1903). See note 29 supra.
38. 80 Neb. 708, 115 N.W. 317 (1908). See note 29 supra.
39. 193 Neb. at 760, 229 N.W.2d at 188.
40. 185 Neb. 4, 173 N.W.2d 378 (1969).

41. Id. at 14-15, 173 N.W.2d at 385.
42. Brief for Appellant at 34-35,
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Conversely, Royal contended that same dichotomy is also grounded
upon the fact that the denial of contribution does not deter the
acts of tortfeasors who are liable for mere negligence.43 Such arguments were not lost on the Nebraska Supreme Court in this instance
as the court recognized the
obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss for which the two defendants were equally,
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered by one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his
collusion
44
with other wrongdoers, while the latter goes scot free.

The Royal Indemnity court realigned itself with the dichotomy
drawn by Johnson v. Torpy,45 denying contribution when the tortfeasor's liability resulted from wrongful or intentional misconduct,
but holding such relief proper when common liability was occasioned by acts of negligence or inadvertence.
That there may be some basis for ... [the deterrence] . . . theory
in cases in which persons directly contemplate the commission of
a wrongful act is obvious, but that it applies equally in cases of
unintentional wrong strains one's credulity. To believe that the
rule of no contribution will tend to make a careless person careful, or that a motorist who is not deterred from carelessness by
fear of personal danger will be affected in his conduct by a legal
rule of no contribution between joint wrongdoers, seems to us
wholly fanciful.46
Thus, the court overruled Tober v. Hampton47 and Farmer'sElevator 4 s to the extent that each was inconsistent with the now effective rule that
a right of equitable contribution exists among judgment debtors
jointly liable in tort for damages negligently caused, which right
becomes enforceable on behalf of any party when he discharges
more than his proportionate share of such judgment.4 9
IV.

ATTENDANT SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Recognizing the unequivocal trend" exhibited by legislative assemblies and state tribunals in providing approbation for contribu43. Id.
44. 193 Neb. at 763-64, 229 N.W.2d at 189, quoting PsossEu, LAw oF ToRTs
§ 50 (4th ed. 1971).
45. 35 Neb. 604, 53 N.W. 575 (1892).
46. 193 Neb. at 763, 229 N.W.2d at 189.
47. 178 Neb. 858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
48. 185 Neb. 4, 173 N.W.2d 378 (1969).
49. 193 Neb. at 764, 229 N.W.2d at 190.
50. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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tion actions between joint tortfeasors, the bulk of relevant contemporary commentary deals not with the basic propriety of such
actions 5 l but instead with the precise application of such a right
under a multitude of factual variants. Despite the supreme court's
unambiguous adoption of a rule allowing contribution between negligent tortfeasors, Royal Indemnity invites a discussion of several
of the numerous substantive and procedural issues which clothed
this action.
A.

Direct Contribution from a Liability Insurer

While Royal Indemnity answered few of the attendant questions
that are likely to arise in subsequent contribution actions, one procedural requirement was announced which had the at least temporary effect of conceding the appellant the battle but awarding the
war to the appellees. The appellees' demurrer included a subtle
two-tier argument which proved to be pivotal to the court's ultimately granting relief. While it was first averred that contribution
was improper in Nebraska, the demurrers additionally challenged
the right of the plaintiff to seek contribution directly from a liability
insurer. 52 While recognizing that Royal was the real party at interest in the litigation as the subrogee of its insured, the court noted
that such a direct action suit against Aetna and Iowa National was
53
not authorized either by statute or under their respective policies.
Since Phil D. Fitzwater was the only actual judgment debtor of
the seminal action who had been joined by Royal in the subsequent
contribution action, the demurrers of Aetna and Iowa National were
affirmed. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's action against Fitzwater. 54 It made the latter ruling
after conceding that Fitzwater might be able ultimately to hold
Iowa National, his liability insurer, liable for his contribution liability.

B.

5

Accrual of Rights and the Statute of Limitations

The specific language of Royal Indemnity vis-A-vis the accrual
of a right to seek contribution is unequivocal. A right of contribu51. At least one commentator has asserted that the practical effects of
contribution run contrary to other valid policy objectives such as risk
spreading. Professor James has argued that contribution will allow
liability insurance carriers to shift part of their loss to uninsured codefendants. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Prag-

52.
53.
54.
55.

matic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1941).
Brief for Appellee Aetna at 12-16.
193 Neb. at 765-66, 229 N.W.2d at 190-91.
Id. at 754, 229 N.W.2d at 184.
Id. at 766, 229 N.W.2d at 191.
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tion becomes enforceable on behalf of any party "when he discharges more than his proportionate share of judgment."5 6 This
requisite that the judgment, or at least a portion in excess of the
tortfeasor's proportional share, must actually be discharged is
57
identical to the provisions of both Uniform Acts.
It seems eminently fair and reasonable that the statute of limitations applicable to contribution actions should not begin to run
until the action has ripened by the claimant's discharge of the judgment. While Royal Indemnity was silent on this question, other
jurisdictions have rebuffed arguments asserting that the right to
seek contribution is derivative and as such is barred at the expiration of the statutory period in effect for the original plaintiff's action.58 Prior Nebraska case law indicates that the statute of limitations of contribution actions will begin to run when the liability
to the plaintiff has been discharged.5 9
1.

Joint Liability Should Not Be Required

Both Uniform Acts allow for contribution actions to lie between
"joint tortfeasors ... whether or not judgment has not been recoverd against all or any of them." 60 The latter phrase was deliberately included by the draftsmen to indicate that joint and several
judgment liability is not a prerequisite for maintaining an action
for contribution under the Acts. 61 While this same tact has been
generally followed by states who have chosen to enact other forms
of statutes authorizing contribution, at least nine states limit the
right of contribution to joint judgment debtors. 62 The question
arises then as to whether the language of Royal Indemnity sanctions
56. Id. at 764, 229 N.W.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
57. 12 U.L.A. 57 § 2(2) (1975); 12 U.L.A. 63 § 1(b) (1975).
58. Keleket X-ray Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
McKay v. Citizen's Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121
(1950); Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 790 (1948).
59. In Weiss v. Weiss, 179 Neb. 714, 716, 140 N.W.2d 15, 17 (1966), it was
held that "a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party has the right to institute and
maintain a suit." (citations omitted).
60. 12 U.L.A. 63 § 1 (1975). The original Uniform Act has language of
identical import. See 12 U.L.A. 57 § 1 (1975).
61. UNiFomv CONTmUTION AMoNG TORTFEASoRs AcT, Commissioners'
Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 61 (1975).
62. Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962); Mississippi, Mss. CODE
A.N. § 85-5-5 (1972); Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1969); New
York, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAws § 15-101 to 107 (McKinney 1964); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 to 6 (1969); Texas, Tnx. REv. CIV.
STAT. art. 2212 (1971); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE Anw. § 55-7-13
(1966).
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actions for contribution between joint tortfeasors or only between
joint tortfeasors who share a judgment-debtor status.
The court's holding that neither Aetna nor Iowa National, as
the insurers of judgment-debtors, were amenable to suit might be
interpreted as allowing contribution only between and among joint
judgment-debtors. The court's decision was premised at least to
some degree on the observation that neither of the insurers
were defendants in the Libbey-Owens Ford Glass case, nor was
any judgment rendered against either of them in the original action ... It is clear, therefore, that they are improper defendants

in this action . . .
The court also noted that there was no statutory or judicial authority, which allowed direct action suits against liability insurance
carriers, 64 and that neither of the insurance contracts provided for
direct action suits by third parties. If it is assumed that the pivotal
reason for the holding was the fact that neither Aetna nor Iowa
National had been a judgment-debtor in the seminal action, it would
seem reasonable to contend that Royal Indemnity only countenances actions for contribution against tortfeasors who are also
judgment-debtors. This reasoning, however seductive, is defective.
Even assuming that Royal Indemnity allowed actions for contribution between joint tortfeasors who were not subject to a joint judgment liability, the actions against Aetna and Iowa National would
still be improper. Royal Indemnity held that a right of contribution
exists only against a "joint tortfeasor." 6 Neither Aetna nor Iowa
National were joint tortfeasors; each was merely the insurer of joint
tortfeasors. Thus, it cannot be stated that the court's refusal to
allow the plaintiff's direct action suits against the defendant insurers buttresses the contention that Royal Indemnity requires joint
judgment liability as a precondition for the right to seek contribution inter se. The court's denial of the plaintiff's right to proceed
directly against the defendant insurers could be based on the narrower limitation of contribution existing only between joint tortfeasors.
2. The Next Question: Is "Common Liability" Required?
While the literal interpretation of Royal Indemnity makes it apparent that contribution should be enforceable against tortfeasors
who were not parties in the suit brought by the injured party, applying this proposition raises a series of more ponderous questions.
Query whether a joint tortfeasor who has discharged more than
his proportionate share of liability can seek contribution from an63. 193 Neb. at 766, 229 N.W.2d at 190.
64. Id. at 765, 229 N.W.2d at 190.

65. Id. at 764, 229 N.W.2d at 190.
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other joint tortfeasor who has a personal defense which would have
made it impossible for the injured party to have recovered directly
against him. 66 This problem could ostensibly arise in Nebraska
with respect to at least four individual defenses: insulation based
on interspousal immunity, 67 the statute of limitations6 s or the Nebraska guest statute,69 or insulation because the injured party is
an employee of an employer tortfeasor with an exclusive and sole
70
remedy under the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act.

In those states which have enacted statutory authority for contribution, these questions are typically less burdensome. Both Uniform Acts require that contribution shall only be allowed after a
joint tortfeasor has discharged more than his proportionate share
of a "common liability."'1 As explained by the draftsmen, "the
common obligation contemplated by this act is the common liability
to suffer adverse judgment at the instance of the injured person,
whether or not the injured person elects to impose it." 72

Hence,

under either Uniform Act, a joint tortfeasor would be prohibited
from gaining contribution from joint tortfeasors whom the injured
party would have been unable to render liable.73
Royal Indemnity did not determine whether contribution will
only be sanctioned when a common liability is shown. As each of
the previously articulated defenses will be presented in future attempts to thwart contribution, the Nebraska Supreme Court should
66. See Comment, Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 9
LAmN & WATER L. REv. 589 (1974) and Note, ContributionAmong Joint
Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against
Action By The Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Wyoming Comment and Cornell Note, respectively].
67. See note 75 infra.
68. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-201 (Reissue 1964).
69. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-6,191 (Reissue 1974). Unlike many jurisdictions
that have held such statutes violative of the due process clause of the

70.
71.
72.

73.

fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Nebraska guest
statute on two recent occasions. Botsch v. Reisdorf, 193 Neb. 165, 226
N.W.2d 121 (1975); Hale v. Taylor, 192 Neb. 298, 220 N.W.2d 378
(1974). Moreover, the most recent attempt by the Nebraska Legislature to repeal the guest statute was also unsuccessful. NEB. LEG. J.
84th Leg., 1st Sess. 2005 (L.B. 491) (May 21, 1975).
NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 48-101 (Reissue 1974).
12 U.L.A. 57 § 2(2) (1975); 12 U.L.A. 63 § 1(b) (1975).
UNIFoR1VE CoNTRIBUTIoN ArVoNG ToRTFEAsoRs AcT § 1, Commissioners'
Comment, 12 U.L.A. 64 (1975).
Mumford v. Robinson, 231 A.2d 477 (Del. 1967), in which the potential
contributor qualified as host of the injured party under the terms of
the state guest statute; Congressional Country Club, Inc. v. Baltimore
& 0. Ry., 194 Md. 533, 71 A.2d 696 (1950), involving workmen's compensation; Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858
(1944), in which the potential contribution defendant was the spouse
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not be induced to adopt a dogmatic approach of lumping all the
various defenses together and deciding whether all or none will defeat an action for contribution. The question of whether a joint
tortfeasor is insulated from actions for contribution because of a
personal defense with respect to the injured party will typically
involve a collision of competing policy considerations. 74 If contribution is allowed under such circumstances, thereby casting aside
the requisite of a common liability, the policy objectives upon which
the special defense is ostensibly premised will be foresaken. Conversely, a denial of contribution because of such a special defense
would sanction the very types of inequities that Royal Indemnity
was intended to prevent.
Fortunately, however, this conflict will not always arise. There
seems to be no reason to deny contribution when to permit it will
not undermine the policy objectives of the particular defense.
When, however, they would be necessarily forsaken by allowing
contribution, the court should weigh the competing policy considerations. Such a balancing analysis would result in a denial of contribution only in those instances where the conflicting policy's
objectives are of a greater magnitude than the equitable underpinnings of contribution and when the application of the latter could
only result in the defeat of the more important purposes of the
former. Thus, since the effect of contribution on the rationale for
particular defenses will vary, the court should consider each defense
separately.
Interspousal Immunity. Nebraska courts have not abolished the
common law prohibition of tort claims between spouses. 75 This position is based on the desire to preserve family harmony and the
of the injured party; McKay v. Citizen's Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va.
851, 59 S.E.2d 121 (1950), in which a statute of limitations was a key
issue.
74. See Cornell Note, supra note 66, at 408-12; Wyoming Comment, supra
note 66, at 599-600.
75. In Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W.
297 (1927), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a wife could not
maintain suit against her husband and that any action that was derivative thereto was equally defective.
The procedural difficulties, the dangers of disrupting the secrecy and serenity of marital relations, the avenue for fraud,
the startling innovation in permitting such recoveries, and
the clear lack of legislative indorsement all have been assigned as ample reasons for the refusal of the courts to sanction, by supplying statutory interpretation, a new form of
litigation requiring unequivocal legislation for its existence.
...

Suits between spouse should be confined as heretofore

to those having contractual elements or where there is direct
statutory authorization.
Id. at 184-85, 216 N.W. at 298-99.
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belief that suits among family members will only imperil that relationship. 76 A policy conflict will arise when a third-party tortfeasor seeks contribution from a tortfeasor who is the spouse of
the injured plaintiff. While early decisions denied a right of contribution against a tortfeasor enjoying the defense of interspousal immunity, the modern trend is clearly to the contrary. 7 In Bedefl
v. Reagan,7s the defendant tortfeasor's third-party complaint for
contribution against the husband of the plaintiff was reinstated.
The court stated that
an assertion by a husband against his wife of a third-party plaintiffs defenses to the wife's action would be reasonably calculated
to engender marital discord but not to any insuperable degree.
Such a regrettable evil must be regarded, however, as more tolerable than a denial of contribution
to the third-party plaintiff in
7
cases such as the one at bar. 9
Thus, the Maine court allowed contribution in spite of the existence of interspousal immunity since the policy considerations of the
former outweighed those of the latter. It is dubious whether the
court's balancing was even necessary. None of the policy objectives
underlying interspousal immunity are vitiated by allowing contribution actions to be maintained against the spouse of the injured
plaintiff.8 0 Marital harmony, as the argument goes, is endangered
when tort actions between spouses are allowed. But when contribution actions against the spouse of the injured party are allowed,
a suit between the spouses is still not being allowed. Hence the
defense of interspousal immunity should not be allowed to deny
contribution between a third-party tortfeasor and the spouse of an
injured plaintiff8 1
76. See PROSSER, LAW Or TORTS § 122 at 859-64 (4th ed. 1971).
77. Cornell Note, supra note 66, at 408-12.
78. 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963). For other cases in accord with Bedell,
see Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 645, 174
So. 2d 122 (1965) and Zarella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673
(1966).
79. 159 Me. at 299-300, 192 A.2d at 24.
80. Cornell Note, supranote 66, at 408-12.
81. This position has been expressed as follows:
Denying contribution from plaintiff's negligent spouse places
an unfair share of the burden of the loss on the third-party
tortfeasor by allowing the defense of interspousal immunity
to be raised against a person other than a spouse. Such a
result is contrary to the trend toward limiting that defense,
and it ignores the fact that the primary policy sought to be
implemented by the defense, the preservation of domestic
harmony, is not violated by permitting contribution. The
financial burden imposed on the family, by cutting in half
its award from the negligent tortfeasor, is justly imposed
because the family unit was as negligent as the third party.
Under the common law, the negligence of one spouse would

have been imputed to the other and would have acted as a
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The Guest Statute. The Nebraska guest statute denies recovery
by the guest against the host unless the latter is guilty of "gross
negligence." 82 Should a tortfeasor be able to seek contribution
from the host after discharging more than his proportionate share
of liability if it is shown that the host was guilty of ordinary, but
not gross, negligence? The answer to this query must be in the
affirmative under the analysis that supports contribution actions
against the spouse of an injured plaintiff. Despite the fact that
several courts have held that a host driver not directly liable to
the guest may effectively raise the guest statute as a defense in
a subsequent action for contribution by a third-party tortfeasor, 3
reason and logic should not 8allow
the guest statute to serve as a
4
defense in a contribution suit.
Such statutes are founded upon the recognition that suits between guests and hosts are unusually susceptible to collusion and
fraud between the parties in an attempt to shift the loss to the
host's insurer. 85 Allowing a third-party tortfeasor to seek contribution from a host who is guilty of less than gross negligence will
not advance the potentiality of either fraud or collusion between
the host and guest. If the third-party tortfeasor has already been
rendered liable for injuries sustained by the guest, the possibility
of the guest and host then entering into a collusive agreement is
no more likely than in any other factual situation involving one
injured party and two tortfeasors. The guest statute should have
no bearing on the issue of the equitable distribution of liability after
such liability has already
been established within the parameters
86
of the guest statute.
Workmen's Compensation. The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act provides that the receipt of any benefits by an employee
from an employer for personal injuries constitutes a release to the
employer for any other claims or demands at law.sT The query

82.
83.
84.
85.

86.
87.

total bar to recovery.
Id. at 411-12.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-6,191 (Reissue 1974).
Troutman v. Modlin, 353 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1965) (applying Arkansas
law); Lutz v. Boltz, 48 Del. Supp. 197, 100 A.2d 647 (1953); and Burmeister v. Younstrom, 81 S.D. 578, 139 N.W.2d 226 (1965).
Cornell Note, supra note 66, at 415.
PROSSE § 34 at 187. Prosser also notes that guest statutes have been
premised on the theory that "one who receives a gratuitous favor in
the form of a free ride has no right to demand that his host exercise
ordinary care not to injure him." Id.
See Shonka v. Campbell, 160 Iowa 1178, 1183, 152 N.W.2d 242, 246
(1967) (Mason, J., dissenting).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-148 (Reissue 1974):
If any employee ... files any claim with, or accepts any
claim from such employer,... on account of personal in-

CONTRIBUTION
is whether an employer should be able to assert such a release as
a complete defense in an action for contribution brought by a thirdparty tortfeasor. Unlike the defenses of interspousal immunity and
the guest statute, allowing a tortfeasor to seek contribution from
an employer who has paid workmen's compensation benefits to the
injured employee undermines the very purpose of the act as well
88
as being violative of its statutory provision of exclusivity.
In Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 89 contribution was not allowed against an employer who had asserted as a complete defense
its payment of workmen's compensation benefits to the employee
who subsequently gained a judgment against the third-party seeking contribution against the employer. The New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act provided that benefits paid by employers
under the act released them from any other liability.90 It was held
that a right of contribution under the circumstances would render
such words of exclusion meaningless. 91
While this issue has not been addressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court, a recent federal court opinion applied Nebraska law
and held that a third-party tortfeasor could not seek contribution
or indemnity from the employer of an injured party after the latter
had received workmen's compensation benefits from the employer.
In Petznick v. Clark Equipment Co.,92 Judge Denney dismissed the
defendant's third-party complaint for either contribution or in-

demnity against the plaintiff's employer on the grounds that "[t] he
Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are exclusive of all liability as to those subject to it. '' 9 3

jury, or makes any agreement, or submits any question to

the [Workmen's Compensation] court under said sections,
such action shall constitute a release to such employer of all
claims or demands at law, if any, arising from such injury.
88. See Cornell Note, supra note 66, at 415-16, Wyoming Comment, supra
note 66, at 603-05.
89. 62 N.M. 38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956).
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-5 (1974), provides:
Any employer who has elected to and has complied with the
provisions of this act . . . shall not be subject to any other

liability whatsoever for the death of or personal injury to
any employee, except as in this act provided; and all causes
of action, actions at law, suits in equity, and proceedings
whatever, and all statutory and common-law rights and remedies for and on account of such death of, or personal injury
to any such employee and accruing to any and all persons
whomsoever, are hereby abolished except as in this act provided.
91. 62 N.M. at 41, 304 P.2d at 568.
92. 333 F. Supp. 913 (D. Neb. 1971).
93. Id. at 914.
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The result rendered in Petznick should not be altered because
of Royal Indemnity's newly heralded right to seek equitable contribution. Even if the exclusivity of compensation benefits was not
subject to statutory amplification under the Workmen's Compensation Act, a third-party tortfeasor should still not have the right
to seek contribution from an injured party's employer since the
Workmen's Compensation Act's abrogation of common law defenses
has as its quid pro quo the absolute yet limited liability as determined from the schedules therein. 94
V. CONCLUSION
Royal Indemnity v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. marks the first
instance in over a half century when the Nebraska Supreme Court
has given careful analysis to the question of whether a co-tortfeasor, after discharging judgment in favor of an injured plaintiff,
may proceed against other co-tortfeasors and seek contribution to
the extent that each negligent party bears his proportionate share
of the total liability. After casting aside as spurious any assertion
that the rule prohibiting contribution between intentional tortfeasors has any relevance to the propriety of such actions between
negligent tortfeasors, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that no
persuasive reasons exist that outweigh the obvious equitable results
afforded by contribution. Hence, Royal Indemnity adopts the enlightened rule that in Nebraska, contribution actions will lie between negligent tortfeasors.
For now, Royal Indemnity may be properly embraced with a
healthy degree of rectitude by the Nebraska practitioner. Its future
application is another matter. However arbitrary and analytically
suspect, the heretofore extant no-contribution rule at least imbued
this area of tort law with a degree of predictability. Royal Indemnity portends no such comfort. Questions remain relating to
whether a tortfeasor, when sued for contribution, may assert defenses against a tortfeasor that would have been successful in defeating an action brought by the injured party. As has been suggested herein, only the exclusivity of remedies awarded under the
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act should exculpate a joint
tortfeasor from suffering judgment from another joint tortfeasor
to the extent of his proportionate share of the common liability.
Sam R. Brower '76
94. See Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy:
The Employee's Right to Sue His Employer, 4 B.C. IND. & COm. L.
REV. 555 (1963).

